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Abstract We improve upon Huntington’s affine geometry by showing that his inde-
pendence proofs can be, in some cases, simplified. We carry out a systematic inves-
tigation of the strict notion of betweenness that Huntington employs (the three argu-
ments are supposed to be distinct) by comparing it to McPhee’s three axiom systems
for the same intended class of structures, which employs weak betweenness (the ar-
guments are permitted to be equal). Upon closely inspecting the proof that McPhee’s
axiom systems are equivalent to Huntington’s (subject of course to the definition
of weak betweenness in terms of strict and vice versa), one finds surprisingly that
McPhee’s axiom systems have quite different relations to strict betweenness.
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1 Introduction
We improve upon some of the results from Huntington’s ordered geometry [2] and
show a curious interplay, in this setting, between “weak” betweenness (the relation
among three points that allows some of its arguments to be equal) and “strict” be-
tweenness (in which the arguments of betweenness are supposed to be distinct ob-
jects). Huntington improved upon an earlier ordered geometries by reducing the num-
ber of postulates from 12 to 5 (and showed that the more parsimonious set H of ax-
ioms has the same models as the original set), and that H is completely independent
in the sense of Moore [5]. With automated theorem provers we can confirm Hunting-
ton’s result and are able to slightly improve upon it by offering a more perspicuous
enumeration of the 32 structures that witness H’s complete independence. (To estab-
lish the complete independence of an axiom system S, one must produce for each
subset X of S a model of X in which every member of S \X is false). More precisely,
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all of Huntington’s 32 examples have cardinality 4, but for only 21 subsets of S are
four elements actually required.
We also aim to address a curiosity pointed out by Huntington in his investiga-
tion of one of the axioms. The curiosity is that while the axiom is necessary, some-
how it plays hardly any role. What is going on? To address this question, we view
Huntington’s geometry through the lens of a definitionally equivalent theory, namely
McPhee’s [4].
Section 2 introduces Huntington’s axiom system H for linear affine geometry
(that is, the affine geometry of a single line) that is in focus. Section 3 recalls the def-
inition of complete independence of an axiom system and refines Huntington’s result
that H is completely independent. Our main contribution can be found in Section 4,
which expands on a curious phenomenon noticed by Huntington about H, namely,
that one of the axioms is necessary but, at the same time, unused (in light of this
curious fact, Huntington calls the axiom “detached”). Section 5 concludes.
2 Axioms
The following are the five axioms (A, B, C, D, and 9) that are in focus in the present
paper. Universal quantifiers implicitly govern all variables. There is only one sort;
the intended interpretation consists of points on a line (though there is no notion of
“line”). Adopting the notational convention in Pambuccian’s survey [7], the symbol
“B” is the ternary relation of betweenness. For brevity, we use “δ (X)” for a sequence
X of variables to stand for the obvious conjunction asserting that the variables in X
are all distinct.
Definition 1 (H) The set H of axioms consists of the following five sentences:
A B(a,b,c)→ B(c,b,a)
B δ (a,b,c)→ (B(b,a,c)∨B(c,a,b)∨B(a,b,c)∨B(c,b,a)∨B(a,c,b)∨B(b,c,a))
C δ (a,x,y)→¬(B(a,x,y)∧B(a,y,x))
D B(a,b,c)→ δ (a,b,c)
9 (B(a,b,c)∧δ (a,b,c,x))→ (B(a,b,x)∨B(x,b,c))
Axiom D tells us that Huntington’s notion of betweenness is the strict one, ac-
cording to which the three arguments of betweenness are intended to be distinct. By
contrast, a more relaxed view of betweenness (e.g., that taken by Tarski [11,12]) per-
mits the arguments to be equal. (In Section 4 we shall investigate another theory of
the affine geometry of a line in which this approach is taken.)
(It is not a mistake that axioms 1–8 are missing from the list. Part of Huntington’s
paper is to replace all 8 axioms, introduced in an earlier paper, by a single axiom,
naturally called 9. He proves that new set of 5 axioms derives all of 1–8. In this paper
the more verbose set of axioms will not be considered.)
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3 Very small independence models
The notion of completely independent set of axioms, due to E. H. Moore [], is a
considerable generalization of the familiar notion of independent axiom. We now
recall the definition.
Definition 2 A set S of sentences is said to be completely independent if, for all
subsets X of S, the set (S \X)∪{¬ϕ | ϕ ∈ X} is satisfiable.
Intuitively, a set S of axioms is completely independent when there is no (Boolean)
relationship among the axioms. One can freely negate some (or even all) of the ax-
ioms, while keeping the rest, and still find models. Evidently, a completely indepen-
dent set is consistent (take X = /0) and independent (negating any particular axiom
still results in a satisfiable set of sentences).
When concerned with showing independence of a set S of axioms, by “indepen-
dence model” one normally understands a structure that satisfies all the axioms save
one, which the model falsifies. When dealing with the notion of independence model,
we take a wider notion of “independence model” because we are interested in falsi-
fying every subset of S, not just its singletons.
With this understanding of “independence model”, it is clear that to demonstrate
the complete independence of a set S of axioms, one has to produce 2|S| independence
models. Even for small sets S, the task is evidently rather tedious. It is remarkable that
in 1924 Huntington did not shy away from the task of showing the complete indepen-
dence of his axiom system. (Perhaps the desire to establish complete independence
for a previously published theory of betweenness, which had 12 axioms, drove him
to simplify the theory. He managed to go from 12 to 5 axioms. With patience, one
can produce 25 = 32 independence models; it is another matter to try to produce
212 = 4096, certainly in the pre-computer age. Nonetheless, van der Walle actually
did this [13].)
When one inspects the 32 independence models Huntington produced to show the
complete independence of H, one finds that they all have cardinality 4. One can im-
prove upon this result by showing that only in some cases do we really need 4 points;
for the rest, we can get by with fewer (sometimes even 1 point is enough). Table 1
lists those cases where an independence model exists having cardinality strictly less
than 4. For the sake of uniformity, every independence model has the domain {1},
{12}, or {123}. Our presentation of the models mimics Huntington’s: we list the
true (and only the true) betweenness statements in the compact notation abc, which
is to be understood as: in the model, Z(a,b,c) holds.
4 A detached axiom
Examining the role that axiom D plays in showing that the new axiom set H derives
the old axiom set H ∪{1, . . . ,8}, Huntington notices that D was never used in any
proof and remarks:
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A B C D 9 Minimal cardinality Interpretation of betweenness in {1,2,3}
+ + + + + 1 (no true betweennesses)
+ + + − + 1 111
+ + − + + 3 123, 132, 231, 321
+ + − − + 3 (all possible betweennesses)
+ − + + + 3 (no true betweennesses)
+ − + − + 3 121
− + + + + 3 123
− + + − + 2 111, 122
− + − + + 3 123, 213, 231
− + − − + 3 111, 123, 132, 211
− − + − + 3 111, 211
Table 1 Only those cases where a smaller cardinality independence model exists are presented.
It will be noticed that postulate D plays a peculiar roˆle. Although it is
strictly independent and therefore cannot be omitted, yet it is not used in prov-
ing any of the theorems on deducibility, and it may always be made to hold
or fail without affecting the holding or failing of any other postulate. It may
therefore be called not only independent but altogether “detached”. [2, p. 275]
“Theorem on deducibility” here means the class of theorems showing that the new
axiom set H is deductively just as strong as the old axiom set (the precise list of whose
axioms need not concern us here). Huntington does not expand on this interesting
comment; after mentioning the issue, he moves on to the heart of his paper, which is
to show the complete independence of his axiom set.
The result is indeed somewhat curious. It appears Cn(Hnew \ {D})=Cn(Hold \ {D})
)that is, the old and the new axiom systems have the same class of models, putting
aside D, and D is an independent axiom of both. It suggests that what we are really
dealing with is a theory of affine linear order in which betweeness of three points
need not imply that the points are distinct. In other words, Hnew \ {D} is consistent
with the falsity of D.
Definition 3 (H ′) Define the axiom system H ′ as H \ {D}.
How, then, can one distinguish between H and H ′? One cannot distinguish the
smallest possible models, because both Hnew and H ′new have 1-element models. (No
axiom ensures non-triviality; it is consistent with both theories that there are no true
betweenness statements at all.) The theories can be distinguished when one starts
adding hypotheses, such as “There is at least one true betweenness statement”. Under
this hypothesis, the smallest model of Hnew has cardinality 3, whereas there is model
of H ′new has cardinality 1.
In the absence of D, a curious possibility is revealed. The fact that D is not usd
to show that Cn(Hold) = Cn(Hnew) vaguely suggests that perhaps the distinctness of
the points is not essential, and perhaps one gets the impression that a generalization
of some kind of available. The intention of the betweenness relation in Huntington’s
axioms is that the arguments of the point are mutally distinct. One sees this in Hunt-
ington’s discussion of his axioms, but conretely, it is obviously by inspecting D.
To investigate this curious issue, we propose to view Huntington’s axioms through
the lens of another theory. By doing so we are following in Huntington’s footsteps.
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Evidently, the curiousness of D was seen only through a detailed inspection of various
theorems of H (more precisely, the derivations from H of the older axioms 1−−8
that are missing from H). We propose to use McPhee’s axiom system for between-
ness [4]. McPhee developed the theory of linear affine geometry using the single
undefined notion of “weak” betweenness Z, which, unlike Huntington’s B, permits
its arguments to be equal. We now list McPhee’s axioms seven axioms and the three
axiom systems that he defines in terms of them:
M1 ∃z∀a,b [Z(a,b,z)∨Z(a,z,b)∨Z(b,z,a)∨Z(b,a,z)∨Z(z,a,b)∨Z(z,b,a)]
M2 (Z(b,a,c)∧Z(c,d,a))→ Z(d,a,b)
M3 (Z(b,a,c)∧Z(d,b,a))→ (Z(c,a,d)∨a = b)
M4 (Z(b,a,c)∧Z(c,a,d)∧Z(d,a,b))→ (a = b∨a = c∨a = d)
M5 Z(a,b,c)∨Z(b,c,a)∨Z(b,a,c)
M6 Z(a,b,c)∨Z(a,c,b)∨Z(b,c,a)∨Z(b,a,c)∨Z(c,a,b)∨Z(c,b,a)
M7 (Z(c,a,d)∧Z(c,b,d)∧Z(a,c,b)∧Z(a,d,b))→ (a = c∨b = c∨a = d∨b = d)
From these 7 axiom McPhee puts forward three distinct axiom systems for con-
sideration:
Σ1 {M1,M2,M3,M4}
Σ2 {M3,M4,M5}, and
Σ3 {M2,M6,M7}.
McPhee proves:
Theorem 1 Cn(Σ1) = Cn(Σ2) = Cn(Σ3).
In other words, McPhee’s three axiom systems are equivalent.
One can also show that McPhee’s three axiom systems and Huntington’s axiom
equivalent to each other in the sense that, starting from one, one can define the sole
primitive notion of the other and prove all its axioms. Consider the two interdefini-
tions of Z and B:
Zdef ∀x,y,z [Z(x,y,z)↔ (B(x,y,z)∨ x = y∨ x = z∨ y = z]
Bdef ∀x,y,z [B(x,y,z)↔ (Z(x,y,z)∧ x 6= y∧ x 6= z∧ y 6= z]
One can prove (we omit the proofs here):
Proposition 1 Cn(Σ1 ∪{Bdef}) = Cn(H) (and likewise for Σ2 and Σ3).
Proposition 2 Cn(H∪{Zdef}) = Cn(Σ1) (and likewise for Σ2 and Σ3).
To better understand the significance of the “detached” axiom D, we can look, as
Huntington did, into the details of the equivalence of H and McPhee’s axioms. Our
question is: What is the analogue of D in McPhee’s axiom systems? Recapitulating
Propositions 1 and 2 with the help of a theorem prover, one proceeds in three steps:
1. Postulate Huntington’s axioms,
2. Postulate Zdef, and
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Axiom System Axiom to derive D needed?
Σ1
M1 no
M2 yes
M3 no
M4 yes
Σ2
M3 no
M4 no
M5 yes
Σ3
M2 no
M6 yes
M7 yes
Table 2 The role played by axiom D in deriving McPhee’s axioms
Axiom System Axiom Needed to prove D
Σ1
M1 no
M2 no
M3 no
M4 yes
Σ2
M3 no
M4 yes
M5 no
Σ3
M2 yes
M6 yes
M7 yes
Table 3 Necessary axioms for deriving Huntington’s axiom D from McPhee’s axioms
3. Derive (each of) McPhee’s axiom systems, inspecting, for each proof, whether D
is semantically needed (its absence leads to countersatisfiability).
Table 2 summarizes the results of this experiment.
Among McPhee’s three axiom systems, we find that only Σ2 requires D in the
justification of exactly one of its axioms. For Σ1 and Σ2 we find, interestingly, that
the influence of (or need for) D is “spread out” or “smeared” among multiple axioms.
Going the other way around, let us reconsider the proof of Proposition 1 that
McPhee’s three axiom systems imply Huntington’s (with the help of Bdef). The ques-
tion, more precisely, is: Starting with one of McPhee’s axiom systems, what is nec-
essary to prove D? Table 3 summarizes the results.
The case of Σ3 is quite curious. There, all axioms are needed (together of course
with Bdef) to derive D. That is, if any of Σ3’s axioms is taken away, D cannot be
proved. Thus, it seems intuitively clear that none of Σ3’s axioms can be taken as the
analogue of D. As we saw earlier, Σ2 does seem to give a satisfactory answer: only
one of its axioms is needed to derive D. But curiously, the “analogue” of D here
differs from the “analogue” we found earlier when we tried to derive Σ2 from H
(second bundle of rows in Table 2)!
5 Conclusion and future work
We have investigated the extent to which Huntington’s axiom D, which enforces the
distinctness of the three arguments of the betweenness relation, is “detached” (as
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Huntington puts it) by looking at it through the lens of three other theories for the
affine structure of a line due to McPhee. Axiom D may thus be detached, but we
hope to have given more insight into how multifaceted its “grip” truly is.
A number of further problems suggest themselves. Pambuccian has drawn at-
tention [6] to Huntington’s paper (among others) as an early example of “resource-
consciousness” in mathematics. In many of Huntington’s proofs, it is explicitly indi-
cated not only what premises are used in the proof, but how many times any particular
premise is used. Although this information was ignored for the results reported here,
this information is quite interesting and deserves to be further studied as a suite of
genuinely mathematical (as opposed to purely logical) cases where close attention is
paid to how an axiom is used (and not just whether it is used at all).
Not all geometry is presented in such an explicit, axiomatic style as we find in
Huntington’s work (and the work of many others). Indeed, it must be said that only
a corner of geometry is given as collections of first-order axiomatic systems. Owing
to expressive limitations of first-order logic, this is probably the best one can hope
for. Nor does a strict axiomatic approach seem to be suitable for all cases, or for all
geometers. Still, when a system of geometry is presented as a finitely axiomatized
first-order theory, a world of possibilities is opened up owing the the applicability of
techniques coming from theorem proving and artificial intelligence. Research tasks
that engaged researchers in the past, such as determining (complete) independence,
become “mechanizable” (though of course there is never a guarantee that, in gen-
eral, such problems are readily solvable). How many problems about geometry were
never posed by great mathematical minds owing to the combinatorial horror of ac-
tually tackling them? How many productive mathematical concepts have been put
forward, only to flounder (like Moore’s notion of completely independent axiom sys-
tem) owing to their inherent tediousness? The price of exploration now is much lower
than it was in Huntington’s day. Let us hope that research in geometry and theorem
proving continues to be a fruitful liaison.
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